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Tine: Employment Discrimination

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
ATONIO v. WARDS COVE PACKING
COMPANY: EN BANC APPROVAL OF
DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR
SUBJECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

I. INTRODUCTION

In Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing CO.l the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en bane, resolved a conflict which had developed within
the circuit regarding the proper analysis of certain employment
discrimination claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.2 At issue was whether an employer's subjective hiring and promotion practices should be found unlawful based on
their adverse impact upon minority employees.3 In reversing a
panel decision,4 the full bench of the Ninth Circuit held that
subjective employment practices which are demonstrably connected to a disproportionate burden on protected groups are fair
game for disparate impact analysis and consequent employer
liability}'
1. 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Tang, J. en bane consideration; Sneed, J. filed
concurring opinion in which Goodwin, J., Wallace, J., and Anderson, J. joined).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982).

3. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1478. Subjective practices are those which allow employment
decisions to consider the' decision maker's discretion. Objective practices are based upon
fixed, measurable factors which eliminate discretion from the decision making process.
See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 201-05 (2d ed. 1983 &
supp. 1987) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
4. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985). See infra notes
117-24 and accompanying text.

5. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1486.
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II. FACTS
This class action was brought by Filipino and Alaskan Native workers employed in the Alaskan salmon canning industry.6
The workers alleged that the defendant employer's hiring practices were discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19647 and of section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.8 The company's operations required a large number of unskilled seasonal workers and a smaller number of skilled employees, some employed on a permanent basis.9 Most of the unskilled
jobs were filled by non-white workers while the more desirable,
skilled, higher paying positions were occupied by whites. IO Specific qualifications for the higher paying jobs were not well defined and individual hiring officers had wide discretion in determining who was best for each job. l l
The suit alleged that the disproportionate concentration of
non-whites in the lowest paying jobs and the virtual absence of
minorities in the skilled, higher paying positions was proof of
discrimination against non-whites. I2 The complaint also alleged
that the employer's use of separate hiring channels, word-ofmouth recruitment, nepotism and rehiring policies, together
with the lack of objective job qualifications and the use of subjective criteria in hiring and promotions all had an unlawful disparate impact on minorities. IS
6. Id. at 1479. See Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
Domingo began as a companion case to Atonio. The plaintiffs were cannery workers with
claims virtually identical to those in Atonio. The district court found unlawful discrimination using disparate impact analysis. Id. at 1435. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the
basis of intentional discrimination. Defendants used racial labels in job assignments;
thus their practices were not facially neutral. Id. at 1436.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
9. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1479.
10. Id. The skilled jobs included machinists, engineers, quality-control personnel,
cooks, bookkeepers, carpenters and others. The permanent employees were management
and office personnel as well as a number of maintainance workers. Atonio v. Wards Cove
Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1985).
11. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1124.
12. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1479.
13. Id. Plaintiffs had also charged that the defendants violated Title VII by segregating the non-white workers into inferior housing and messing facilities. The district
court found that these practices did not violate Title VII. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1130-31.
The majority en banc opinion did not specifically address these claims.
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The district court found that although the plaintiffs had
successfully made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendants had rebutted the inference of intentional discrimination by convincingly showing nondiscriminatory motivations. 14
The trial judge refused to apply disparate impact analysis to the
subjective hiring and promotion practices citing Ninth Circuit
precedent. I6 A Ninth Circuit panel, while acknowledging the existence of a conflict within the circuit, affirmed. I6 The plaintiffs'
petition for a rehearing was granted so that the conflict could be
resolved en banc. 17
III. BACKGROUND

A.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against any employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. IS The Act regulates all aspects of the employment relationship and provides for
only limited exemptions. I9 The Supreme Court has stated that
the objective of Title VII is the eradication of unnecessary barriers which impede the achievement of equal employment
14. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1120.
15. Id. at 1131. The district court applied disparate impact analysis to the allegation
of nepotism but found no discrimination. Id.
16. Id. at 1132-33. See infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
17. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) permits classifications based on sex, religion or
national origin (but not race or color) where sex, religion or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) permits employers to apply different
standards pursuant to bona fide seniority or merit systems and to act upon the results of
professionally developed ability tests provided such system or test is not intentionally
designed to discriminate.
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opportunity.20
The Supreme Court recognizes two theories under which Title VII violations can be proved: (1) disparate treatment and (2)
disparate impact.21 Under the disparate treatment theory, an
employer violates Title VII by intentionally treating people less
favorably because of their race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. 22 The disparate impact theory, in contrast, predicates
employer liability on the significant adverse impact of an employer's facially neutral practice which cannot be justified by
business necessity.23 In practical terms, a crucial difference between the two theories is the necessity of proving an employer's
discriminatory motive. 24 The Supreme Court has stated that
such proof is "critical" to a disparate treatment case but is "not
required under a disparate-impact theory."25
In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff will always retain
the burden of persuasion26 but the burden of producing evidence
will shift.27 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971). See infra notes 35-41
and accompanying text.
21. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977). In a suit brought by the government, a union and a trucking firm were found to
have intentionally engaged in a pattern of discriminatory treatment of blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons. [d. at 342. The court held that Congress' vesting of broad equitable powers in Title VII courts enabled them to fashion the most complete relief possible
to remedy violations under the Act. [d. at 364. Such relief can include awards of retroactive seniority to persons who could prove that they were deterred from seeking employment by their knowledge of the discriminatory practices. [d. at 367.
22. [d. at 335 n.15.
23. [d. at 336 n.15.
24. [d. at 335 n.15.
25. [d. The Supreme Court has stated that either theory may be applied to a particular set of facts. [d. at 336 n.15.
26. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). A female denied promotion to a position subsequently filled by a male successfully established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. [d. at 251. The court of appeals held that
the employer must rebut by proving his nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions by a
preponderance of the evidence. [d. at 256. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the
burden of persuasion was always on the plaintiff. [d.'
.
27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). After being laid
off, plaintiff participated in an illegal demonstration to protest the employer's racial policies. [d. at 794. The employer refused to rehire plaintiff ostensibly because of plaintiff's
prior illegal conduct. [d. at 796. The district court found this reason sufficent to support
dismissal of the case. [d. at 797. The Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff's prima
facie case has been rebutted he must still be afforded an opportunity to prove that the
employer's otherwise legitimate reason was actually a pretext for unlawful discrimina-
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of intentionally discriminatory treatment. 28 The prima facie case
creates a rebuttable presumption and shifts the burden of production to the employer. 29 The employer meets this burden by
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory action. 30 The burden then returns to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's articulated reason
is, in fact, a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 31 In Fumco
Construction Corp. v. Waters,32 the Supreme Court emphasized
that the primary function of this order of proof is to analyze and
evaluate the evidence for its bearing on the critical question of
discrimination. 33
In contrast to disparate treatment's preoccupation with unlawful motivation, the disparate impact theory defines illegal
discrimination as the use of a selection device which adversely
and disproportionately affects a protected minority and cannot
be justified by business necessity regardless of the employer's
motivation. 34 The Supreme Court first adopted disparate impact
analysis in the landmark case Griggs v. Duke Power CO.3/) At issue in Griggs was the employer's use of a standardized intelligence test and a high school diploma as prerequisites for emtion. Id. at 804.
28. Id. at 802. The precise elements of a prima facie showing will vary with the
particular facts of a case. Id. at 802 n.13. See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (any production of evidence "adequate to
create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion
illegal under the Act" was sufficient to make a prima facie disparate treatment case).
29. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. See supra note 26.
30. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See supra note 27. See also Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254-55, where the Court stated that while the defendant need not persuade the
court, he must support his articulated reason by introducing sufficent evidence to justify
a judgment in his favor. By carrying this burden the defendant rebuts the plaintiff's
prima facie case. Id. at 255. Failure to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case will result in
a directed verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 254.
31. MeDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Pretext can be proven by showing that the
defendant's proffered reason was either not the actual motivating factor or that it was
simply not believable. Id.
32. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 577.
34. D. BALDUS AND J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION § 1.23 at 44-45
(1980 & Supp. 1986).
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv.
59,62 (1972) (discussion of the background and implications of Griggs: "Griggs is in the
tradition of the great cases of constitutional and tort law which announce and apply
fundamental legal principles to the resolution of basic and difficult problems of human
relationships.").
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ployment. 36 The plaintiffs demonstrated that these requirements
served to exclude blacks at a substantially higher rate than
whites. 37 The district court and the court of appeals found that
the requirements had not been implemented for a discriminatory purpose and hence there was no violation of Title VII.38
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that practices which operate to exclude blacks from employment opportunities are prohibited unless they are necessary to the employer's business.39
Such practices cannot be saved by the absence of intentional
discrimination. 40 The consequences of employment practices
may render those practices unlawful under Title VII just as
readily as their motivation. 41
To succeed under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff's
prima facie case must establish that the employer's neutral
screening requirement produces a significantly discriminatory
pattern of employee selection.42 The burden then shifts to the
employer to prove that the challenged requirement or practice is
manifestly related to the particular job in question. 43 However,
36. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
37. Id. at 430 n.6.
38. Id. at 428.
39. Id. at 431. The Court referred to business necessity as the touchstone. Id. It
found that Congress had mandated that objective, demonstrably job-related qualifications govern the employment relationship so that race, sex, religion and nationality
would become irrelevant in measuring a person for a job. Id. at 436.
40. Id. at 432.
41. Id. Title VII had been in effect for less than six years when Griggs was decided.
Prior to passage of Title VII, Duke Power, a South Carolina employer, had openly discriminated against blacks. Id. at 426-27. Discrimination in South Carolina schools had
also led to blacks receiving inferior educations. Id. at 430. The Court recognized that
under Title VII this pre-Act discrimination could not be allowed to perpetuate itself. Id.
42. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). A female plaintiff challenged
the height, weight and gender requirements that the Alabama Board of Corrections imposed on applicants for the position of correctional officer. Id. at 324. The Supreme
Court held that the height and weight requirements failed to meet the job-relatedness
standard under Griggs analysis. Id. at 332. The gender requirement was held valid as a
bona fide occupational qualification. Id. at 336-37.
The statistical showing necessary to establish that a disparity is significant has become a major battleground for Title VII disparate impact litigation. See SeHLEI AND
GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 98-102.
43. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). A class of black employees alleged that the employer's use of employment tests which had an adverse impact on blacks violated Title VII. Id. at 409. The district court found that the tests were
job-related on the basis of a company validation study. Id. at 411. The Supreme Court
held that the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures provided the
standard for measuring the job-relatedness of employment tests and that the tests in
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whereas the employer's rebuttal burden in a disparate treatment
case is merely one of producing sufficent evidence to rebut the
inference created by the plaintiff's prima facie case,44 in a disparate impact case he carries a burden of persuasion at this stage!!>
The employer must persuade the fact-finder that the challenged
practice is necessary to safe and efficient job performance.46
Thus, business necessity is an affirmative defense of the use of a
practice that has been shown to be discriminatory in effect.4,1
The existence of this weightier rebuttal burden helps explain
why employers would prefer to defend against a disparate treatment claim.
The Supreme Court has held the disparate impact theory
applicable to measure the impact of each component of a selection system even if the impact of the complete system is racially
proportionate.48 Thus far the Supreme Court has directly applied the disparate impact theory only to clearly defined, nondiscretionary selection devices which were facially neutral. 49 In
question did not meet this standard. Id. at 430-31.
44. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
46. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14. The defendant's burden has been described both
in terms of business necessity, Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, and job-relatedness, Albemarle
Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. Although they are frequently used interchangeably, there is some
question as to whether the two concepts are identical. See Note, Business Necessity:
Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376, 388-89
(1981) (Supreme Court's failure to adequately define the business necessity defense has
permitted the lowering of strict Title VII standards and has resulted in lower court confusion). See also Johnson, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody: The Aftermath of Griggs and
the Death of Employee Testing, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1257 (1976) (Supreme Court
deference to EEOC Guidelines for validating the job-relatedness of employee tests condemned as imposing impossible burden on employers).
47. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. If the employer proves the necessity of the
challenged practice, the plaintiff may still triumph by proving that the employer's legitimate interest may be equally well served by a less discriminatory device. Id.
48. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455-56 (1982). An examination used to screen
promotion candidates had a disproportionate impact on blacks and was not job-related.
Id. at 445. Unsuccessful black examinees sued under the disparate impact theory. Id. at
444. The employer defended by proving that successful black examinees were promoted
at higher rates than whites so as to correct any adverse impact on blacks. Id. The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision rejected this "bottom line" defense. Id. at 452. The majority emphasized that Title VII protects the rights of individuals and that if the examination was not job-related its disparate impact was proof of a Title VII violation. Id. at
448. The dissent believed that the disparate impact theory was only relevant to measure
the final results of a selection process. Id. at 458. (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 445 (standardized test); New York Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (blanket exclusion of methadone users held justified by
business necessity despite disproportionate impact on minority applicants); Dothard, 433
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Fumco Construction Corp. v. Waters tlo the defendant's foreman,
who had complete discretion in hiring decisions, refused to accept walk-on jon site applications and instead hired only persons
known or recommended to him as experienced. til The plaintiffs,
qualified black bricklayers who applied at the job site, contended that this policy had a disproportionate impact on
blacks. tl2 The SUpreme Court decided that the proper analysis
for the caie was under the disparate treatment theory.tl3 In a
footnote the Court noted that the challenged practice did not
involve 'efuployment tests or physical requirements such as had
previously been analyzed under the disparate impact model. tI4
This footnote has been read as evidence of a deliberate Supreme
Court intention to restrict the scope of the disparate impact theory to purely objective practices. tIti
B.

SUBJECTIvE CRITERIA AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY

Title VII gives the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the authority to issue, amend or rescind procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act. tl6 The
EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,
first published in 1970, define discrimination as the use of a selection procedure which has an adverse impact on a protected
U.S. at 329-31 (minimum height and weight requirements); Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at
427 (standardized intelligence test); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (standardized tests, high
school diploma requirement).
50. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
51. [d. at 569-70.
52. [d. at 570. The district court subjected the claim to Griggs analysis but found
there had been no showing that the practice had a disproportionate effect.
53. [d. at 575.
54. [d. at 575 n.7. Writing separately, Justice Marshall did not dispute that the disparate treatment approach could be used to analyze the workers claims. [d. at 582 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But he identified word-of-mouth
recruitment and the limiting of hiring to those with prior experience working for a particular employer as facially neutral practices which could be analyzed under the disparate impact theory. [d. at 583 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. 3 A. LARSON AND L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 76.32 (1987 & 1987
Supp.) Professor Larson contends that because the foreman had unlimited discretion in
hiring decisions, the practice of refusing to hire job site applicants actually had a subjective basis. His position is that restricting Griggs analysis to purely objective practices is
sound because of (1) the difficulty in validating subjective decisions and (2) a conceptual
incompatibility between disparate impact analysis and subjective judgments. [d.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982).
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class and which cannot be validated. 57 By adopting this approach in Griggs, the Supreme Court definitively brought unintentional discrimination within the reach of the Act.58 The Uniform Guidelines, which the Supreme Court has accorded great
deference,59 include subjective interviews in its definition of employee selection procedures. 60
In 1972 Congress amended Title VII to expand its cover61
age and to provide enforcement powers to the EEOC.62 At the
time that the amendments became law the Uniform Guidelines
had been published and Griggs had been decided. In adopting
the amendments, Congress did not intend to change existing
law, as developed by the courts, except where expressly addressed. 63 Lower court decisions, pre-dating Griggs, had applied
disparate impact analysis to subjective employment practices. 64
Neither Congress nor the Griggs opinion expressly restricted the
use of disparate impact analysis to purely objective practices. 65
57.
58.
59.
60.

29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1987).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
Id. at 433-34; Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.16 (1987) provides:
(Q) Selection procedure. Any measure, combination of measures, or procedure used as a basis for any employment decision. Selection procedures include the full range of assessment
techniques from traditional paper and pencil tests, performance tests, training programs or probationary periods and
physical, educational and work experience requirements
through informal or casual interviews and unscored application forms.
61. The 1972 amendments deleted the original exemptions of state and local government employees and employees of educational institutions from Title VII coverage. Pub.
L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 (1982».
62. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5
(1982».
63. Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 884-85 (1972) (objective analysis of 1972 amendments and review of their legislative history).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 449 F.2d 800, 804 (4tlI Cir. 1970)
Hiring and assignment system without uniform objective standards which vested wide
discretionary authority in departmental supervisors produced a racially imbalanced
workforce with blacks concentrated in less desirable jobs. The Fourth Circuit held that
such practices, although not overtly discriminatory, classify and segregate on the basis of
race.
65. Although the Supreme Court has not yet squarely considered the issue of subjective practices, in Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 433, the Court critici2ed the employer's
reliance on subjective supervisor ratings which were offered as validation of a pencil-andpaper test. The Court was manifestly skeptical of a practice in which subjective judgments were the basis of the employer's assertion of job-relatedness. Id.
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During the decade following Griggs lower courts consistently applied the Griggs doctrine to subjective employment
practices. The leading case is Rowe v. General Motors,66 in
which black hourly employees challenged the company's practice
of promoting workers based on a foreman's subjective evaluation
of an individual's ability.67 The plaintiffs introduced statistical
evidence of a significant disparity in employment opportunities
for blacks.68 The Fifth Circuit quoted Griggs in condemning
General Motors' (GM) reliance on the subjective judgments of
its foremen. 69 Only legitimate business necessity could excuse a
practice which even inadvertently disadvantaged minority employees. 7o The GM procedure, as applied, violated Title VII because there was no proof that the affected blacks were unqualified for the higher positions. 71 Rather than being job-related,
GM's subjective recommendation system provided an avenue for
the individual prejudices of the foremen. 72 The Fifth Circuit was
careful not to accuse either GM73 or its foremen of intentionally
discriminating but explicitly recognized the potential for subconscious discrimination.74
In Griggs, the Supreme Court had indicated that objective
qualifications that were manifestly job-related should control
employee selection procedures.75 The Rowe doctrine postulated
that subjective practices afforded a ready mechanism for discrimination which could be proved through disparate impact
analysis. 76 The Rowe rationale was widely followed. 77 Disparate
66. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
67. [d. at 353.
68. [d. at 357.
69. [d. at 354.
70. [d.
71. [d. at 358·59. Rowe identified five factors which contributed to the unlawful system: (1) The foreman's recommendation was the most important single factor in the
promotion process; (2) Foremen were not given written instructions pertaining to the
qualifications necessary for promotions; (3) The foremen's own standards were vague and
subjective; (4) Employees were not notified of openings nor informed of necessary qualifications; (5) There were no safeguards to prevent discrimination. [d.
72. [d. at 359.
73. [d. at 355. GM was praised for its affirmative recruiting of blacks, but in spite of
these laudable steps the company's current policies might still be in violation of Title
VII. [d.
74. [d. at 359.
75. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). See supra note 39.
76. Rowe, 457 F.2d at 359. See also Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co.,
457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.) (subjective standards are badges of discrimination which
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impact analysis was applied to subjective criteria through the
entire gamut of employment determinations from recruitment to
layoffs.78 The mere use of subjective determinations was sufficient to raise a suspicion of discrimination although, without
proof of a disparate impact, such practices were not per se
unlawful. 79
Ten years after Griggs, the Ninth Circuit, in Heagney v.
University of Washington,80 refused to use the disparate impact
theory to evaluate an employer's discretionary classification system. 81 The University categorized non-academic employees as either "classified" or "exempt".82 Classified employees had their
salaries set by state law and adjusted by an administrative
agency.83 Exempt employees filled jobs with unique or unstandardized requirements and had their salaries set and adjusted at the discretion of the University.84 The plaintiff was a
research scientist whose job was categorized as "exempt".85 She
maintained that her salary was lower than comparably situated
males because of the University's discrimination.86 In her suit,
she alleged both disparate treatment and disparate impact.87
Before remanding for further consideration of the disparate
corroborate the inference of discrimination drawn from statistical disparity in the work
force), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
77. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rowe applicable to group decisions); James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 329
(5th Cir. 1977) (disparate impact analysis of subjectively decided job assignments), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Senter v. General Motors, 532 F.2d 511, 526-30 (6th Cir.)
(cited and followed Rowe in applying Griggs to subjective promotion scheme), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 928 (10th
Cir. 1975) (vague subjective promotion decisions condemned under Rowe-Griggs analysis); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.) (subjective criteria
provide possibilities for abuse), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Baxter v.
Savannah Sugar Refining Co., 495 F.2d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 1974) (subjective promotion
system the cause of discrimination).
78. Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L.
REV. 737, 745 (1976) (synthesis of decisions involving subjective criteria offering pragmatic guidance for practitioners).
79. Hester v. Southern Ry., 497 F.2d 1374, 1381 (5th Cir. 1974) (subjective hiring
procedure need not be validated where there was no discriminatory pattern).
80. 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
81. ld. at 1163.
82. ld. at 1159.
83.ld.
84.ld.
85.ld.
86. ld. at 1158-59.
87. ld. at 1163.
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treatment claim, the court briefly discussed whether her charge
could be analyzed under Griggs. ss
The plaintiff contended that the University's practice of
categorizing jobs as "classified" or "exempt" was a facially neutral practice which could be shown statistically to have a disproportionate impact on the salaries of female employees.s9 Without
elaboration, the Ninth Circuit simply concluded that the University's practice could not be equated with objective practices
and that disparate impact analysis was inappropriate. 9o Subjective employment decisions, such as the classifying of employees
or the discretionary setting of salaries, must be shown to be intentionally discriminatory.91 The court cited no authority for its
refusal to require that the University prove the "job relatedness" of its practice.
In Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America92 the
employer's entire promotion scheme, which included subjective
components, was challenged. 93 The plaintiffs provided evidence
of a racial imbalance94 but the Fifth Circuit refused to allow a
disparate impact attack on the cumulative effect of the company's policies.95 Only the specific practice identified as responsible for the disparate impact need be validated. 96 An employer
would be unfairly handicapped if forced to validate all of his
practices upon the bare showing of a statistical disparity.97 The
Pouncy court demanded proof of a causal connection between
the disparity and the challenged employment practice. 98 The
Fifth Circuit panel also objected that subjective practices were
riot akin to the traditional bases for disparate impact analysis.99
88. [d.
89. [d.
90. [d. The opinion does not explain why the University's system of classification
could not be considered a facially neutral practice suitable for Griggs analysis.
91. [d.
92. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
93. [d. at 799. Job vacancies were not posted but rather white supervisors selected
candidates for promotion using minimal objective criteria. Also, employee performance
evaluations were rated largely on a subjective basis. [d.
94. [d. at 799.
95. [d. at 800.
96. [d. at 801.
97. [d.
98. [d.
99. [d. In declaring that subjective practices were not "akin" to the traditional ob-
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For authority the Pouncy court cited a treatise,t°o whose definition of "neutral employment practices" is limited strictly to
those purely objective requirements considered in Griggs and
Albemarle Paper v. Moody.lOl The Fifth Circuit panel failed to
discuss the Rowe doctrine even though Rowe was cited approvingly in the casel02 and was precedent for the Pouncy court to
follow or distinguish.

In the aftermath of Heagney and Pouncy a previously settled area of the law became markedly fractured. loa The Ninth
jects of disparate impact analysis, the Pouncy court adopted a conclusional approach
similar to that employed in Heagney. Neither court expounded on the critical differences
between objective and subjective practices which warrant disparate impact analysis of
the former but which deny application of the theory to the latter.
100. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 801.
101. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 73.00 (1987 & 1987
Supp.). See supra note 55.
102. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800 n.7. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
103. There is currently much disagreement on the issue throughout the circuits. The
First Circuit has not had to decide the issue. See Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion v.
Secretary of Housing, 799 F.2d 774, 787 (1st Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Polaroid, 732 F.2d
1010, 1015 (1st Cir. 1984).
The Second Circuit has generally applied disparate impact analysis to subjective
practices. See Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729 F.2d 85, 95-96 (2nd Cir. 1984) (subjective tenure process examined); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel, 635 F.2d 1007, 1016 (2nd Cir.
1980) (subjective-word-of-mouth hiring methods). But see Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather,
Inc., 798 F.2d 590, 605 (2nd Cir. 1986) (refusal to extend disparate impact analysis to
subjective criteria).
The Third Circuit has applied Griggs analysis to a promotion process which includes
subjective components. Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 672, 674 (3d Cir.
1983).
The Fourth Circuit currently refuses to apply disparate impact analysis to subjective
criteria despite an earlier history of following Rowe. See, EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank,
698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir. 1983) (disparate impact analysis only applicable to objective
standards), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S.
867 (1984); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20,22 (4th Cir. 1982). But see, Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 982 (1972).
The Fifth Circuit generally adheres to the position that it took in Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 797 n.12 (5th Cir. 1986) (discretionary promotion
procedure does not fit impact analysis), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 3227 (1987); Cunningham v. Housing Authority, 764 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1985) (disparate treatment applicable to subjective hiring and promotion decisions); Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d1266,
1271 (5th Cir. 1985) (disparate impact not appropriate for discretionary promotion procedure); Walls v. Mississippi State Dept. of Public Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 321 (5th Cir.
1984) (use of subjective criteria analyzed under disparate treatment model); Vuyanich v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th Cir.) (disparate impact not the proper
model to measure discriminatory hiring statistics), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984);
Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1983) (disparate impact
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Circuit has noted the inherent dangers of the use of subjective
model inapplicable to subjective hiring and placement evaluations); Carpenter v. Stephan F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 1983) (Pouncy dictates that
discretionary decisions be examined for discriminatory intent); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699
F.2d 776, 779 n.6, (5th Cir. 1983) (subjective decisions analyzed under disparate treatment model); Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760, 765 (5th Cir.)
(discretionary decisions not within scope of disparate impact model), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 991 (1983); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798, 817 (5th Cir.) (subjective
hiring interviews not subject to impact analysis), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982). But
see, Page v. U.S. Industries, 726 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984) (despite Pouncy, Rowe
still permits impact analysis of subjective practices); Harrell v. Northern Elec. Co., 672
F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir.) (subjective evaluations not sufficient business justification to
refute disparate impact showing), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982).
The Seventh Circuit cases have been on both sides of the issue. See Regner v. City
of Chicago, 789 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing a disparate impact claim to proceed in reference to a subjective evaluation process); Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d
921, 927 (7th Cir.) (applying disparate impact analysis to word-of-mouth recruitment
and separate hiring channels), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982). But see Griffin v. Board
of Regents, 795 F.2d 1281, 1288 n.14, (7th Cir. 1986) (disparate impact analysis inappro·
priate for subjective faculty hiring decisions).
The Eighth Circuit has recently indicated a willingness to apply disparate impact
analysis to subjective decision-making. See EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318,
327-28 (8th Cir.) (subjective hiring practices which have disparate impact on women
must be justified by business necessity), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 307, (1986); Jones v.
Hutto, 763 F.2d 979, 983-84 (8th Cir.) (adverse impact of excessively subjective practices
was sufficent premise for liability), vacated on other grounds, 106 S.Ct. 242 (1985). See
also Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 772 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir.) (apparent willingness to
apply disparate impact analysis to subjective promotion claim), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
972 (1984). But see Talley v. United States Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505, 507 (8th Cir.
1983) (subjective decision-making system cannot form the foundation of a disparate impact case); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.6 (8th Cir. 1981) (improper
use of subjective procedures for demotions not a Griggs-type case).
The Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits apply the disparate
impact theory to all manner of subjectively-based employment practices. See Lojan.v.
Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917, 930 n.19 (6th Cir. 1985) (use of subjective
criteria is a facially neutral practice subject to Griggs analysis); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 93 (6th Cir. 1982) (subjective evaluations scrutinized under both
theories); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1985) (impact analysis proper
to evaluate use of subjective practices); Lasso v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co.,
741 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.1 (10th Cir.) (impact analysis appropriate for subjective promotion
policy), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (lOth
Cir. 1981) (purpose of Griggs approach is to restrict use of subjective practices causing
disparate impact); Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., 646 F.2d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1981) (impact analysis appropriate for subjective policies); Williams v. Colorado Springs School
Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) (impact analysis appropriate for hiring
system vesting nearly total discretion in school principals); Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line
Ry., 767 F.2d 771, 776 (11th Cir. 1985) (disparate impact theory applicable to subjective
selection process); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985) (subjective
promotion process is facially neutral practice vulnerable to attack by disparate impact
analysis); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d1516, 1523-25 (11th Cir. 1985) (disparate impact
theory is appropriate to challenge selection process containing subjective elements);
Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 619-20, (11th Cir. 1983) (subjective
selection and promotion procedures open to disparate impact attack), cert. denied sub

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/8

14

Tine: Employment Discrimination

1988]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

141

criteria in the disparate treatment contextlO4 but has not found
them per se prohibited by Title VII.lol> In conflict with Heagney
is Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman/o 6 decided one year after
Heagney. The plaintiff in Wang challenged an entire promotion
process, which contained subjective components, under both disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. lo7 The district
court analyzed the claim only under disparate treatment and
found that there was no discrimination because the plaintiff was
not the most qualified applicant. lOS The panel reversed and remanded to resolve the disparate impact claim. lo9 The Wang
court believed that it would be anomolous to require the plaintiff to prove that he was the most qualified under the promotion
system when he was alleging that the system itself was discriminatory and not sufficiently job-related.Ho First, the system itself
would have to be examined for its impact and, if found to have a
disproportionate effect on minorities, it would have to be proven
to be job-related.l l l The panel took note of the highly subjective
nom James v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 104 U.S. 1415 (1984); Segar v. Smith, 738
F.2d 1249, 1270-72 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no sound policy reason not to apply impact analysis
to employment practices causing disparate impact), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
104. See Kimbrough v. Secretary of United States Air Force, 764 F.2d 1279, 1284
(9th Cir. 1985). In Kimbrough a qualified black applicant was denied a promotion based
on subjective evaluations. Id. at 1281. The court found discriminatory treatment holding
that a subjective promotion process, while not discriminatory per se, should be scrutinized closely for evidence of abuse. Id. at 1284; see also Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d
1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981). In Nanty a qualified Native American applicant was summarily refused an opportunity to apply for a job vacancy. Id. at 1329-30. His prima facie
disparate treatment case went unrebutted. Id. at 1332. In remanding to determine
whether plaintiff would have been hired in the absence of discrimination for the purpose
of fashioning relief, the court cautioned that subjective criteria should be viewed with
much skepticism. Id. at 1334; Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 656 F.2d
1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981). In Lynn a female professor was denied tenure despite fulfilling objective requirements. Id. at 1340. Court found statistical data of pattern of sex
discrimination helpful particularly where discriminatory treatment is alleged in highly
subjective tenure process. Id. at 1342.
105. Ward v. Westland Plastics Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1980). The plaintiff alleged that she was discharged because of sex discrimination evident in the employer's subjective evaluation of her job performance. Id. at 1269. The court affirmed the
trial court's finding of no discrimination. Id. at 1270. Subjective evaluations, the court
noted, are not discriminatory per se nor do they impose a burden of proving absence of
intentional bias. Id. In a footnote the court apparently endorsed use of impact analysis
for subjective criteria, the first word on the subject in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1270 n.l.
106. 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982).
107. Id. at 1147.
108. Id. at 1148.
109. Id. at 1149.
110. Id. at 1148.
111. Id.
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aspects of the system and expressed concern over the possibility
for bias. l12
The Wang approach has been approved by a number of
panels in the Ninth Circuit. ll3 Others have chosen to adhere to
the Heagney rationale and restrict subjective criteria to the disparate treatment model. ll4 A Ninth Circuit panel discussed the
conflict in Moore v. Hughes Helicopters ll5 and although clearly
skeptical of applying disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria, the issue was side-stepped because the plaintiff had failed
to prove the requisite impact. ll6
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

THE PANEL DECISION

The issue of the applicability of disparate impact analysis to
subjective practices was directly before the panel in Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co.ll7 The disparities existing at the canneries were striking and the companies' practices were highly
discretionary.lls The Atonio panel chose to follow the Heagney
v. University of Washington ll9 line of cases as the better reasoned approach.120 The panel recognized the tension between Ti112. Id. at 1148-49. The practices complained of included the ad hoc determination
of hiring criteria for a particular job, the use of supervisor evaluations and the system
used by a supervisors committee to correlate the criteria with the candidates. Id. at 1147.
The district court found that a language skills requirement was added as a pretext to
disqualify the plaintiff. Id. at 1147-48 n.2.
113. See Yartzoff v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1984) (disparate impact
analysis applied to subjective criteria but no disparate impact shown); Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 969 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (case remanded to determine whether subjective tests which were not job-related had a prima facie disparate impact on blacks). See
also Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1436 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (dicta
recognizing that in some situations disparate impact analysis would be appropriate for
use of subjective hiring criteria). Peters and Wang were decided by identical panels.
114. See Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir.) (lack
of well-defined criteria as facilitating wage discrimination is a claim better presented
under the disparate treatment model), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (subjective wage-setting criteria
properly analyzed as a disparate treatment case); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d
864, 866 (9th Cir. 1982) (disparate treatment must be applied to allegations of vague
promotion criteria).
115. 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983).
116. Id. at 481-82.
117. 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985).
118. Id. at 1124.
119. 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
120. Atonio, 768 F.2d at 1132. The panel alao felt constrained by stare decisis to
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tIe VII ideals and the operation of the free market system.l2l By
restricting disparate impact analysis to objective selection procedures, employers would be permitted the greatest freedom in defining employment qualifications yet would still be liable for intentional discrimination under the disparate treatment mode1. 122
This holding would be consistent with a perceived Congressional
policy of minimum interference with employer prerogatives. 123
The panel feared that extending disparate impact analysis to
subjective decisions, with the consequent elimination of the necessity of proving discriminatory intent, would impel employers
to adopt quota hiring systems. 124
B.

THE

En Banc

MAJORITY

The full bench of the Ninth Circuit in Atonio v. Wards
Cove Packing CO.125 reversed the panel decision and resolved the
conflict within the Ninth Circuit by extending application of the
disparate impact theory to subjective employment practices.126
Disparate impact and disparate treatment were characterized as
simply "analytic tools" to be used to ascertain whether there has
been impermissible discrimination by an employer.127 The Supreme Court had sanctioned the use of either theory as applied
to a particular set of facts. 128 The Atonio majority interpreted
this as authorizing the use of whichever theory was most helpful
in answering the ultimate question in a given case.129 Prior decisions which had refused to apply impact analysis to subjective
follow Heagney as the oldest unoverruled precedent. [d. at 1132 n.6. The Wang panel
was chided for not discussing Heagney. [d. at 1132.
121. [d. at 1132.
122. [d. at 1132-33. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
123. [d. at 1132. The panel did not specify which Congressional enactment supported this policy but rather noted that the Griggs doctrine was judicially created and
not explicitly provided for in Title VII. The panel was unimpressed with the argument
that Congress had ratified Griggs in passing the 1972 amendments. [d. See supra notes
61-65 and accompanying text.
124. Atonia, 768 F.2d at 1132.
125. 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987).
126. [d. at 1478.
127. [d. at 1480 (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 130 (3d Cir.
1985»; Goodman stated that the search for impermissible discrimination is the ultimate
question in a Title VII action and cautioned against losing sight of it while enforcing the
intricate evidentiary rules. [d.
128. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336
n.15 (1977). See supra note 25.
129. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1480.
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practices were expressly overruled.130 Henceforth, a plaintiff in
the Ninth Circuit may attack subjective practices or criteria if
his prima facie case contains three elements: (1) proof of a significant disparate impact on a protected class, (2) identification
of specific employment practices or selection criteria and (3) a
showing of the causal relationship between the identified practices and the impact. 131
Writing for the majority, Judge Tang132 observed that Title
VII outlaws discrimination without reference to an objective or
subjective basis/ 33 and that the Supreme Court has not expressly limited the disparate impact theory to purely objective
criteria.134 The full bench accepted the view that Congress endorsed Griggs and other decisional law when it amended Title
VII in 1972.1311 Cases at that time had applied impact analysis to
subjective practices.13s The court reasoned, therefore, that applying impact analysis to subjective practices would be consistent with Congressional intent. 137
Further support was drawn from the fact that the agencies
charged with the enforcement of Title VIl13s have promulgated
regulations which apply the disparate impact theory to all employee selection procedures without regard to subjective-objective distinctions. 139 These regulations have been accorded great
deference by the Supreme Court and can be read as communi130. Id. at 1486.
131. Id. at 1482. By requiring proof of a causal connection, Atonio incorporates the
bare holding of Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
132. Judges Tang and Anderson were members of the Atonio panel.
133. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482 ("Title VII states that it is an unlawful employment
practice to limit, segregate, or classify . . . employees or applicants for employment in
any way." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(2)(1982» (emphasis in original).
134. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482.
135. Id. at 1482 (citing Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of Title VII
Disparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 939 (1985), in which the legislative history of the 1972 amendments is extensively reviewed. Helfand and Pemberton argue that
Congressional policy demands an expansive reading of the Griggs doctrine).
136. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 657-58 (2nd Cir.
1971). See also United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 802, 804 (4th Cir.
1970).
137. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1482-83.
138. Included are the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Department of Justice and Department of Labor.
139. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1483. See supra note 60.
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cating the will of Congress. 140 Since the purpose of Title VII is to
remove unnecessary barriers to equal employment opportunities,
Judge Tang believed that limiting disparate impact analysis
would retard execution of that purpose.141 A subjective practice
unaccompanied by a conscious intent to discriminate may still
operate as an unnecessary barrier; therefore the court felt such
practices should be exposed to disparate impact scrutiny.142
The Ninth Circuit squarely confronted the argument that
the Supreme Court had limited use of the disparate impact theory in Furneo Construction Corp. v. Waters.143 Fumeo was distinguished because the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under the disparate impact theory.144
They had not proven that the challenged practice actually had
an adverse impact on minority applicants. 1411 The Atonio plaintiffs had fully satisfied the three elements of a prima facie disparate impact claim. l4S Consequently, Judge Tang interpreted
Fumeo as imposing "no limitation on the use of impact analysis
beyond the restrictions inherent in demonstrating a prima facie
case."l47 Nothing in Furneo forbade analysis of subjective practices under the Griggs doctrine. 148
The Ninth Circuit was not content to simply support its
holding with appropriate authority but defended it forcefully on
the basis of logic and policy. The defendants had contended that
because subjective decisions are, by nature and definition, reflective of the decision-maker's conscious motivations, such decisions are unlawful only if an actual intent to discriminate is
proven. 149 This contention was dispelled by the en bane court. A
subjective practice may be a vehicle for intentional discrimination, but it may also be discriminatory even though the employer's conscious intent is completely neutral or even benign.lllo
140.
(1971».
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1483 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434
Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1483.
Id.
438 U.S. 567 (1978). See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1484.
Id.
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If the subjective practice is used as a covert means to mask discrimination, its very coverture will make it difficult to prove the
invidious intent. l5l If such practices are causing a disproportionate impact on a protected class, the purposes of Title VII are
well served by allowing proof of the impact to be the basis of
liability and thus eliminate the need for proving intent.162 Proof
of intent may be as undesirable as it is unnecessary because of
the ill will that such proof may engender.163

The Ninth Circuit believed that allowing a distinction to be
made between subjective and objective practices would actually
subvert the purpose of Title VII because employers bent on discriminating would be encouraged to dispense with objective
standards in an effort to avoid judicial scrutiny.164 The full
bench perceived the distinction as basically meaningless because
most selection procedures encompass both objective and subjective elements.166 Since the area is so grey, courts would continue
to have difficulty discerning when disparate impact analysis
would be proper.168 Therefore, insisting on a meaningless distinction would not be helpful to future trial courts.167
The Ninth Circuit considered whether its decision would
impose an unfair burden on employers. In rebutting a prima facie disparate impact claim, the court discerned no inherent unfairness in forcing an employer defending a subjective practice
to shoulder the same burden as an employer defending objective
criteria.168 In either case the heavy burden of proving business
necessity is appropriate because of the employer's unique position as the party most knowledgeable about the purposes and
effects of his employment practices.169 Such a burden is commensurate with the plaintiff's task in proving his prima facie
case.180 The court approved of challenging numerous practices
either individually or collectively as long as the requisite show151. Id.
152.Id.
153.Id.
154. Id. at 1485.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1486.
160. Id. at 1485.
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ing of a causal connection to a disparity is made. 161 If the de-'
fendant's burden is arduous it is because Title VII's purpose of
extinguishing discriminatory employment practices mandates
that it be SO.162 That purpose is best realized, the court held, by
submitting subjective employment practices to disparate impact
analysis. 163
C.

CONCURRENCE

The concurring opinion evidences a concern that the majority's opinion may lead to disparate impact and disparate treatment being used interchangeably.164 Because the majority provided no guidance in determining in which situations each
theory should be used, Judge Sneed proposed some standards of
differentiation. 16 He advanced a theory that would look to the
function of the challenged practice as a means of determining
whether disparate impact or disparate treatment is the correct
theory to apply.166 He agreed with the majority that the subjective-objective distinction was not a meaningful one.167 Under his
theory, disparate impact analysis would be proper whenever the
plaintiff has challenged a practice that renders his true qualifications irrelevant. 16s If the employer has ignored the plaintiff's
known qualifications for an allegedly discriminatory reason, the
claim is properly analyzed under the disparate treatment
model. l69 The nature of the wrong as pleaded and proved will
determine which theory is applicable. 170 The respective burdens
should be allocated accordingly.l7l
1)

Judge Sneed acknowledged that his theory had not as yet
been adopted by any court but that its application was consistent with the results reached in a number of cases in which simi161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 1486 n.6.
at 1486.
(Sneed, J., concurring).
at 1486·87 (Sneed, J., concurring).
at 1489 (Sneed, J., concurring).
at 1490 (Sneed, J., concurring).
at 1490-91 (Sneed, J., concurring).
at 1491 (Sneed, J., concurring).
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lar questions had been examined.172 The canneries' practices
were subjected to Judge Sneed's theory rendering results somewhat at odds with the majority.173 Under his theory, the plaintiff's claims of discrimination in connection with rehiring policies, subjective criteria and segregation in housing and messing
were correctly dismissed by the district court.174 But he believed
that the separate hiring channel and nepotism claims should
have been remanded for analysis under the disparate impact
theory.l711
V. CRITIQUE
The full bench of the Ninth Circuit has restored a mighty
weapon to the arsenal of the Title VII plaintiff by permitting
subjective employment practices to be attacked through disparate impact analysis. A plaintiff who can prove that a significant
statistical disparity is causally linked to an employment practice
is relieved of the necessity of proving that the disparity was
caused by purposeful discrimination. 176 The Atonio court performed exhaustive analysis which relied on the high ideals of Title VII and an expansive interpretation of Supreme Court precedents. While cognizant that employer prerogatives would be
restricted by its decision, the en bane court appreciated that the
basic premise of Title VII demands that employers not be free
to utilize practices which may foster discrimination.177
The Ninth Circuit refused to accept a conceptually rigid
distinction between the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. Acceptance of a supposed bright line drawn between subjective and objective practices would have led to severe restrictions on the use of disparate impact analysis. Instead,
the Atonio court adopted a pragmatic approach which described
the two theories as analytic tools useful in identifying impermissible discrimination. l78 Title VII litigation in the Ninth Circuit
will now focus on the ultimate question of discrimination rather
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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than on ancillary characterization issues. Such an approach can
only enhance the likelihood that the goals of Title VII will eventually be achieved.
Affirming the original panel decision would have created an
incentive for employers to institute subjective procedures which
would be vulnerable only to disparate treatment attack. Under
the disparate treatment analysis, an employer need only articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his employment
decisions. 179 A subjective practice having a disproportionate impact would violate Title VII only upon proof of the discriminator's unlawful state of mind. An employer would not have to
prove the business necessity of his subjective practice. Since
subjective practices have long been recognized as being particularly susceptible to discriminatory abuse,180 it would be anomolous to impose a lighter burden on employers using such practices while demanding that objective practices be more
rigorously scrutinized. By rejecting this anomoly the Ninth Circuit's en bane decision is likely to spur employers to examine
their procedures to eliminate sources of subtle discrimination.181
Where subjective practices are immune from disparate impact analysis, characterization of a challenged practice is of critical importance. 182 Plaintiffs would have to carefully draft their
disparate impact claims in terms of objective practices while defendants would emphasize the subjective aspects of those practices. By recognizing that such a distinction is not meaningful,183
the Ninth Circuit has freed trial courts from having to decide if
a particular practice is subjective or objective. The Atonio court
realized that there is no bright line between subjective and objective employment practices. 184 By focusing on the ultimate
179. See supra note 30.
180. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
181. See Denis, Subjective Decision Making: Does It Have a Place in the Employment Process?, 11 EMPL. REL. L. J. 269 (1985) (practical advice to employers for avoiding
Title VII liability).
182. Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity, and Equality,
28 SUP. CT. REV. 17, 29-30 (1979) (arguing that current confused standards of adverse
impact and job validation are detrimental to economic productivity without promoting
equal employment opportunity).
183. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1485. "When we view employment practices from the perspective of their impact on a protected class we are unable to see a principled and meaningful difference between subjective and objective practices." Id.
184. Id. The facts of Atonia are illustrative of this point as word-of-mouth recruit-
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question of discrimination, the Ninth Circuit's Atonio opinion
reflects a determination to advance the purposes of Title VII
and not be preoccupied with procedural niceties. The Ninth Circuit is unconcerned that the line between disparate impact and
disparate treatment may become blurred as long as the eradication of discrimination and its effects is furthered. 18
1)

The Atonio court provided welcome guidance to future trial
courts and litigants by clarifying the elements necessary for a
prima facie disparate impact case. The court emphasized that a
plaintiff must prove a causal link between specific, identified
practices and the bottom line disparity.18s By stressing this
causal link, the en bane court disarmed those who fear that indiscriminate use of the disparate impact theory could impose an
injustice on an employer forced to defend his entire selection
process. 187 The plaintiff, not the defendant, must link the disparity to specific practices and not simply rest after proving the
imbalance. However, the court expressly provided that practices,
once identified, could be considered individually and collectively.188 As long as a plaintiff is specific, Atonio does not limit
the range or number of practices which can be attacked and
linked to the disparity. The link in Atonio was established inferentially through the identification of the practices and proof of
the disparity.189 This will probably be the usual method of establishing the connection, but since the burden is on the plaintiff, in a close case, direct proof may be required.
In assessing the relative evidentiary burdens in a disparate
impact case, the Atonio court believed that the employer's heavy
ment, rehire policies and nepotism all include both subjective and objective elements.
185. [d. at 1486.
186. [d.
187. See Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982).
Ct. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985). In Segar, an employee's challenge of the cumulative effect of a company's practices was found appropriate where the plaintiff could make out a prima facie showing of
a significant disparity. [d. at 1266. Defendant, in rebuttal would have to identify which
practice caused the disparity to meet his burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity. [d. at 1270. With plaintiff's proof and defendant's identification of the specific practice, all elements of a disparate impact case would be before
the court. [d. at 1271. Thus, there would be no reason why defendant should not prove
the business necessity of the practice which he has identified. [d.
188. Atonia, 810 F.2d at 1486 n.6.
189. [d.
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rebuttal burden would be commensurate with the plaintiff's difficult task in establishing a prima facie case. 190 Emphasis on the
difficulty of the plaintiff's undertaking seems to be implicit recognition that justifying the necessity of a disparity-causing subjective practice may be impossible. l9l Nevertheless, such a practice must be justified or it violates Title VII. An employer must
change his practices or be prepared to contest the elements of
the plaintiff's prima facie case. The plaintiff's statistical evidence may be attacked as inaccurate, incomplete, non-probative
or false. 192 Only after all the elements have been established and
the employer has failed to discredit the prima facie case does the
defendant's arduous burden of proving business necessity arise.
The broad implications of Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing
Co. should not be underestimated. Virtually any employment
practice may subject an employer to Title VII liability if it disproportionately impacts a protected group and cannot be justified. 193 The Ninth Circuit swept away artificial limitations on
the use of the theory. Instead, Atonia suggests that the boundaries of the disparate impact theory are only those "restrictions
190. Id. at 1486.
191. Where the qualifications for a job can be readily measured in terms of objective, quantifiable skills, such as the blue collar jobs at issue in Atonio, subjective assessments of applicants will rarely, if ever, be justifiable under Title VII standards. A more
difficult problem is posed when the jobs in question, such as those in Heagney v. University of Washington, 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981), have unique or difficult to define qualifications. Arguably subjective standards are more defensible in the latter case. Nothing
in Judge Tang's opinion suggests limiting the use of disparate impact analysis. Whether
the disparate impact theory should be used to evaluate discrimination in upper level jobs
is a question which has generated considerable academic discussion. See, e.g. Bartholet,
Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945 (1982); Maltz,
Title VII and Upper Level Employment - A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw.
U.L. REV. 776 (1983); Newman, Remedies for Discrimination in Supervisorial and Managerial Jobs, 13 HARV. CR-CL. REV. 633 (1978); Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REV. 737 (1976).
192. Although the order of proof in a disparate impact case is described as a threepart process, an intermediate step exists where the defendant may attempt to refute the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search
for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376, 384 n.38 (1981). See supra note 46.
193. Since the court explicitly overruled the panel decision, subsequent cases which
relied on it may now have their authority questioned. Notably AFSCME v. Washington,
770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) where in a comparable worth challenge to the state's practice of paying salaries based on prevailing market forces, the court reversed the district
court's finding of Title VII liability based on application of disparate impact analysis.
Citing the Atonio panel, the court found the practice not to be one to which the disparate impact theory is properly applied. Id. at 1405-06.
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inherent in demonstrating a prima facie case. m94 This test, derived from the Ninth Circuit's expansive reading of Supreme
Court cases, recognizes that not every employment practice can
have its impact defined and measured. Such practices would be
resistant to disparate impact challenge simply because of the
difficulty of proving a prima facie case. The disparate impact
theory is based on proving discrimination through a statistically
significant showing. It follows that the boundaries of the theory
are to be found in the science of statistics and not in an arbitrary distinction between subjective and objective criteria. 195 By
refusing to limit disparate impact analysis to objective criteria,
the Ninth Circuit has chosen to permit expansion of the theory
to its logical limits.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit is now firmly among those circuits which
refuse to limit application of the disparate impact theory to
purely objective employment practices.196 Minority and female
employees may be expected to demand that all manner of employment practices which have tended to exclude them from employment opportunities be justified under the rigorous test of
business necessity. Unless the United States Supreme Court imposes limitations on its use, the disparate impact theory is available to employees at any level to challenge any employment
practice within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit as long as he
or she can satisfy the elements of a prima facie case.

Donald A. Tine*

194. Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1484.
195. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987), to hear the
single question: "Is the racially adverse impact of an employer's practice of simply committing employment decisions to the unchecked discretion of a white supervisory corps
subject to the test of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)?" 43 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH) , 37,130 (JUNE 22, 1987). By answering this question the Supreme Court
should settle the issue of whether the disparate impact theory is applicable to subjective
employment practices.
196. See supra note 103.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
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